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INTRODUCTION
Early on August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq invaded and later annexed Kuwait. This increased Iraq's oil resources from 15% to 20% of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) annual output and increased Iraq's proven reserves from 13% to 25% of OPEC's proven reserves. Backed by 12 United Nations (UN) resolutions (Neff, 1990), the coalition sought Iraq's unconditional withdrawal fXom Kuwait. Initially, the coalition relied on economic sanctions and diplomatic negotiation. The UN set a January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On January 16, when sanctions and diplomacy had not succeeded, the multinational coalition turned to military force in an effort dubbed "Operation Desert Storm."
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The United States was the dominant member of the coalition forces. This lead to U.S. concerns, particularly early in Operation Desert Storm, that many countries benefiting from the coalition's actions were "free riding" (i.e., contributing less than their fair share to the coalition forcing the U.S. to foot the bill). This concern applied to members supplying both military forces and financial aid. Burden sharing can be a divisive factor in international political and economic relationships. This paper will examine burden sharing in Operation Desert Storm. In particular, it will examine defense alliances models and data from Operation 
BURDEN SHARING IN DEFENSE ALLIANCES
The economic theory of alliances is based on public goods theory. A public good is any good where consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.
Nonrivalrous consumption means that several individuals can simultaneously consume a good without affecting the value anyone receives from that good.
Nonexcludability means that it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to deny access to any consumers, irrespective of their payments for the good. 2 Street lights satisfy both criteria of public goods. They are nonrivalrous because many pedestrians and vehicles can simultaneously consume the light. They are nonexcludable because it is virtually impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to deny anyone access to street lighting once it is installed.
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) were among the first to hypothesize that defense alliances provide public goods. Based on this hypothesis, they concluded that defense alliances will provide less than the optimal amount of defense goods and some countries will bear costs exceeding their relative share of the total benefits.
Individual countries making independent decisions will provide public goods until the additional cost of the last unit they provide equals the benefit they receive from that unit. In this decision, individual countries ignore the benefits their expenditures provide-to others (called external benefits). Similarly, each country receives defense benefits from their allies' defense expenditures (called spill-over benefits; external benefits provided by one country become spill-over benefits to its allies). Countries have an incentive to substitute these spill-over benefits for their own defense expenditures. When countries cannot be excluded from enjoying spillover benefits, they have an incentive to "free ride" (i.e., relying on defense resources provided by other alliance members). External/spill-over benefits limit the total quantity of the public good provided. This creates suboptimality (i.e., the incremental cost of additional units of defense is less than the combined incremental value received by all alliance members).
External and spill-over benefits shift costs to those who place a higher value on the public good, as determined by preferences and resources. 3 It is important to recognize that all alliance members free ride. The opportunity to pass some costs to one's allies in part creates the mutual benefits enjoyed by all alliance members (if an alliance did not provide its 3 Disproportionality refers to the distribution of costs and benefits within the alliance. In particular, disproportionality implies that members with the highest value for the public good pay a percent of the costs that exceeds their share of the total benefits. Conversely, members with a low value for the public good pay a disproportionately small cost share. members with more defense for a lower cost, members would not voluntarily participate). Because all alliance members free ride, the burden sharing debate really concerns perceived equity and the relative extent of free riding across alliance members. 4 A country becomes dissatisfied if it perceives that its share of the costs exceed its share of the benefits. This is taken as a sign that it is free riding less than its allies. 5 
Mixed Public and Private Benefits
More recently, authors have questioned whether defense expenditures provide purely public benefits. Noting that public goods are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, Hildebrandt (1990) emphasized that the benefits of purely public defense goods are independent of which member supplies the good. In other words, there are no distinct benefits associated with ownership of purely public defense goods. If defense goods are deployed in a way that increases the benefits of the provider, at the expense of the alliance, the goods contain a private element. 4 The burden sharing debate focuses on the ratio of costs and benefits across alliance members because measuring the extent of free riding is impossible. Equating the costs/benefit ratio across alliance members is not necessarily optimal or equitable. For example, it does not consider ability to pay or differences in the marginal utility of income or military expenditures. The problem is further aggravated when the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP is used as a proxy for the ratio of costs to benefits. Defense expenditures and GDP are not good proxies for defense benefits and costs. Despite these caveats, the ratio of costs to benefits will be used to measure equity in this paper because it is commonly used in political debates. Gates and Terasawa (1992) discuss equity in defense alliances in more detail. 5 There is a distinction between efficiency and equity. Efficiency requires increasing the total level of defense until the marginal defense cost to any one alliance member equals the sum of the marginal benefits received by all alliance members. The distribution of the defense burden across alliance members is determined by the member's relative costs. For efficiency, marginal defense costs should be equal for all alliance members. The conditions for efficiency do not consider equity. If the alliance is efficient, there is no guarantee that costs will be proportional to benefits. considering this characterization, it seems appropriate to distinguish public from private defense goods by the degree tQ which the resources are committed to the alliance. (Gates and Terasawa, 1992) Commitment refers here to whether the member providing the resource relinquishes effective control over that resource. Defense goods are fully committed if the provider has transferred all effective control over the asset to the alliance. This ensures that the resource will be deployed to best achieve the alliance's objectives. Fully committed resources are purely public goods. Resource are partially committed if the provider retains somie control over the resource.
With partial commitment, the provider can deploy the resource in a way which benefits the provider at the alliance's expense (e.g., the alliance would have used the resource differently, ex ante, if it was controlled by t.e alliance).
Therefore, alliance members are likely to consider the asset at less than it's full value, decreasing external and spill-over benefits. Finally, the resource is purely private if the provider retains complete control over the resource and it's expected deployment is not likely to provide the alliance any benefit (i.e., there are no external or spill-over benefits). As the ratio of private to public benefits increases, external/spill-over benefits decreases and equity increases. 6 Inequities also decrease in commitment based alliance models when longterm relationships are important. When alliance members are concerned with maintaining long-term relationships (including defense, political and economic 6 Other authors distinguish between public and private defense goods based on the resource's physical characteristics rather than commitment. (Sandler and Forbes, 1980; Murdoch and Sandler; 1982 , 1984 Sandler, 1988 ) This explanation appears inconsistent with Operation Desert Storm where defense resources appear to have provided public benefits regardless of their physical characteristics. relationships), they may be more cooperative. (Kuenne, 1988; Palmer, 1990) Cooperation, including bargaining, can increase equity.
BENEFITS FROM OPERATION DESERT STORM
Operation Desert Storm's primary objective was to secure Kuwait's freedom. Over 30 countries supported this objective. 7 These countries all benefited in various ways. Some of the primary benefits attributed to Operation Desert Storm include: preserving national sovereignty, securing the Middle East supply of oil and increasing regional and international stability.
All countries can simultaneously consume these benefits and it is impossible to deny any country access once they are secured. Thus, these are public benefits (they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable). Different countries may receive different values, but that is consistent with public goods theory. 8 There is one possible exception. The coalition's stated objective was to secure Kuwait's freedom. However, some critics assert that the U.S. had an additional objective: to destroy Iraq's military capability. If this was a U.S. objective, and no other country shired this objective, then the U.S. may have derived some private benefits from Operation Desert Storm. To the extent that the U.S. retains control over its own resources (and those provided by 7 Afghan Mujahedeen, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Soviet Union, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States. (Bowman, 1990 ; Defense News, Feb. 4, 1991: 31) $For example, reconsider street lights. Street lights provide several benefits. Motorists benefit from safer driving conditions and pedestrians benefit because street lights make them more visible to motorists and help deter crime. Thus, street lights provide different benefits to different consumers. Each consumer attaches different values to these benefits. Despite differences in valuations, street lights are a public good as long as the benefits are nonrivalrous and non-excludable. most other coalition members), it could pursue private objectives at the expense of the coalition's overall objectives. However, if destroying Iraq's military capability is the most effective way to achieve the coalition's objective, then U.S. contributions could still be considered public.
Because the benefits were nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, the resources supporting Operation Desert Storm were public goods to the extent that they were committed to the coalition.
The commitment based alliance model predicts that disproportionality is likely if participants make independent, voluntary contributions. On the other hand, disproportionality may be modest if alliance members are concerned with maintaining long-term relationships.
It is necessary to compare each country's relative cost and benefits to examine the extent to which empirical data indicate inequity. Benefits will be discussed briefly. 9 Costs will be discussed in turn. Changes in one source of supply or demand will affect all market participants.
Thus, disruptions in oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait will have impacts extending beyond consumers relying on those particular suppliers (though countries impor-ing oil from Iraq and Kuwait will bear the short run transactions costs of switching suppliers).
An alternative approach measures the oil supply security benefit by looking at a country's overall reliance on imported oil. According to this 0 President Bush acknowledged this U.S. national sovereignty benefit at a news conference on March 1, 1991. According to President Bush, victory in the Persian Gulf reduces the risk that U.S. troops will have to go into battle someplace else in the future. (Griffith, 1991: 2A) argument, all oil consumers pay more for oil as world oil prices increase. Unfortunately, the value of the oil supply security benefit is more complex than indicated by dependence on foreign oil. The most appropriate measure of this benefit is actually related to the impact that world oil prices have on current and future GDP. GDP's sensitivity to changes in the world oil prices is measured by the elasticity of GDP with respect to changes in the world price of oil (referred to here as oil price elasticity). This measure is defined as the percentage change in GDP divided by the percentage change in world oil prices. It is a unit-less number showing the sensitivity of GDP to changes in world oil prices.
Comparing oil price elasticities will indicate the relative impact of an increase in oil prices on two different countries. The absolute effect on GDP depends on both the oil price elasticity and the magnitude of the oil price change. Both the relative and absolute effects are important in discussing burden sharing in Operation Desert Storm. The relative effects on GDP determine the distribution of the security of oil supply benefit. The absolute effects on GDP determine the significance of this benefit.
Considering oil price elasticity, conventional wisdom may be misleading.
The distribution of the oil supply security benefit may not correspond to a country's reliance on either Persian Gulf or imported oil. Countries that have invested in energy efficient manufacturing capabilities may have lower oil price elasticities. Thus, they may suffer a relatively small decrease in GDP as oil prices increase, even if they import more of their oil.
This may well characterize comparisons between the U.S. and both Japan and Germany. Japan and Germany have invested heavily in energy efficient production technologies. Their oil price elasticities may be smaller than in the U.S. If this is true, the relative security of oil supply benefit may actually be larger in the U.S. than in either Japan or Germany.
The Appendix to this paper models the impact of a disruption in world oil supplies on GDP for three hypothetical countries. All three countries consume two final products, oil and an industrial product produced using oil In the model, energy efficiency in manufacturing is assumed to be higher for the country importing all of its oil. 1 1 If there is enough difference between energy efficiencies, the oil price elasticity is smaller for the country importing all of its oil. Thus, its oil supply security benefit would be smaller than for the country importing only a portion of its oil. As the " 1 Specific values for energy efficiencies used in the model and the resulting oil price elasticities are given in the Appendix. This stylized model is illustrative. It is highly simplified and derives results for hypothetical, though not implausible, parameter values. The intent is to show that "foreign oil dependency" can be a poor proxy for evaluating the economic consequences of an oil supply disruption. Specific model details are discussed in the Appendix.
relative energy efficiency of the oil import-dependent country decreases, its relative oil price elasticity increases. According to this stylized model, the relative impact of an oil supply disruption on GDP depends on both energy efficiency in manufacturing and the level of dependence on imported oil.
Neither one alone predicts the relative impacts on GDP.
Several sources estimate GDP elasticities for the U.S. and Japan. For example, Rasche and Tatom Thus, evidence indicates that the elasticity of GDP with respect to changes in world oil prices may be higher in the U.S. than in Japan and Germany. Consequently, the relative security of oil supply benefit may be lower in these countries than in the U.S.
The overall significance of the security of oil supply benefit depends on both the oil price elasticity and the magnitude of the change in world oil However, oil price increases elicit both a supply and demand response. On the supply side, higher oil prices would encourage other oil producers to increase output in the short run. OPEC's inability to raise oil prices to their target levels since the early 1980's indicates the strength of this incentive. In fact, world oil supplies quickly replaced the oil production lost with the embargo on Iraq and Kuwait ( Figure 2 ). In the long run, higher oil prices would encourage exploration for new reserves and expansion of existing oil production facilities (e.g., in the USSR). These supply side responses would put downward pressure on world oil prices.
On the demand side, higher oil prices encourage consumers to conserve oil and look for alternative energy sources (e.g., natural gas). In addition, Some members contributed resources (manpower, aircraft, ships, armed vehicles, etc.). Others contributed cash and in-kind assistance to help cover U.S.
costs and to aid countries suffering adverse impacts from the conflict and the embargo on Iraq. Finally, some countries contributed by observing the economic embargo on Iraq. Each of these contributions will be discussed.
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Defense Resource Contributions Figure 3 shows the manpower contributed by the significant participants in Operation Desert Storm. 14 In addition to military resources, some countries pledged cash and inkind assistance to the coalition. Figure 4 shows the cash and in-kind contributions to the U.S. for participants in Operation Desert Storm. 16 Several countries also provided aid to the "front-line states" (Turkey, Jordan and Egypt) and other countries affected by the economic embargo on Iraq. This aid is part of a country's contribution to Operation Desert Storm. 17 Figure 5 summarizes these contributions for selected coalition participants. 17 There are additional contributions that should be included. Consider Egypt. The U.S. has forgiven $7 billion in military debts, the Gulf states have forgiven $7 to $9 billion in debts and Egypt has received close to $10 billion in additional loans (withheld prior to August 2, 1990).
(Abdalla, 1991; Parker, 1991) This aid involves direct benefits and costs, but it is difficult to value. For example, the value of debt forgiveness must be discounted by the probability of default and for the time value of the foregone future payments. Similarly, the cost of loans must consider the opportunity coat of the money loaned and the probability of default. For these reasons, only direct cash grants are included in this analysis. While GDP in oil importing countries decreased because of the Iraqi oil embargo, oil exporting countries received an increase in oil revenues. In particular, both oil prices and output increased as other producers expanded production to replace the embargoed oil. As a result, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) received windfall gains. These were at least partially offset by both decreases in GDP due to higher world oil prices and the costs incurred to expand oil production. Estimates are not available for the impact of higher oil prices on GDP in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia claims to have spent $4B to expand oil production. The net gain for both countries is shown in Table 5 . For reference, Figure 6 combines the costs of defense resources, cash and in-kind contributions, aid to front-line and other states, and the indirect costs (windfill profits) of the embargo on Iraqi oil. Recalling the measurement problems associated with these estimates and that some important contributions have not been considered, Figure 6 gives a preliminary estimate of the total incremental cost of Operation Desert Storm. Using GDP as a proxy for defense benefits implies that the objective of defense is to protect a nation's income. However, Operation Desert Storm had several other direct and indirect benefits, as discussed previously.
Furthermore, the value of these benefits depends in part on the level of the perceived threat. 1 8 Defense expenditures become more valuable as the perceived threat increases. GDP does not reflect the range of benefits or perceived threat.
Considering the wide range of benefits and threat perceptions, it would not be surprising to observe two nations contributing different amounts to Operation Desert Storm even though they have identical GDPs. This result could even occur if defense burdens were shared equitably. GDP serves as a proxy for defense benefits only if all other factors are identical for all alliance members. If this ceteris paribus assumption is violated, the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP cannot measure equitably. 1 9 Measurement problems also arise in using defense expenditures as proxies for contributions to the coalition. The ratio of GDP to defense expenditures was first used by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). They appropriately hypothesized that, all other things equal, there will be a significant positive correlation between defense expenditures and a nation's GDP. The ceteris paribus assumption has not been explicitly acknowledged in the succeeding studies using this measure. 2 0 Troops at risk and expected casualties are important measures of a country's contribution. Before the end of a conflict, the number of actual casualties is uncertain. A country's commitment to the coalition's objectives is measured by it's expected casualties. If actual casualties are lighter than expected, it reduces the total cost the country actually pays. It does not reduce the country's commitment to the coalition. Because of the measurement problems described above, it is impossible to calculate a single quantitative index to compare equity across coalition members. Instead, gener" impressions can be drawn by qualitatively comparing the coalition members' relative contributions and benefits.
Considering the national sovereignty, oil supply security and regional stability benefits attributed to Operation Desert Storm (recall Table 3 ), it appears that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states gained the most from the coalition's actions. They recived the greatest national sovereignty and regional stability benefits. These are the most significant benefits.
Japan and Germany probably received the smallest benefits. At best, the security of oil supply benefit is modest in the short run and probably negligible in the long run. Furthermore, Japan's and Germany's indirect national sovereignty benefits are also modest because of their current constitutional limits on military actions beyond their boarders (i.e., limits on their role as world policeman).
Finally, the U.S. probably received a greater indirect national sovereignty benefit than the U.K. or France. The U.S. places a greater emphasis on its role as world policeman (and/or perceives a greater threat to its view of the appropriate world order) and has closer ties to Israel. The U.S., U.K. and France probably received similar relative values from the other benefits. Thus, the U.S. received greater benefits than either the U.K. or Arabia, their combined contribution would have increased by over $7B. Much of this cost would still be offset by windfall oil profits. 2 3 At the other extreme, Japan and Germany seem to have made financial contributions exceeding their share of the benefits. It appears that their primary benefit was maintaining good relationships with the U.S. In particular, both Japan and Germany significantly increased their contributions shortly after the war began. These additional pledges appeared to result in large part from intense U.S. lobbying (Walsh, 1991) .24 With bargaining, countries valuing the public good more highly .4i.e., the U.S.) can encourage other countries to increase their share of the burden. (Though there might also have been an increase in the perceived threat as the war approached and finally became reality.)
IMPLICATZONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The benefits from Operation Desert Storm include national sovereignty, regional and international stability and oil supply security. These benefits are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. Therefore, they are public benefits and resources committed to the coalition are public goods. Public goods theory predicts that coalition members will contribute unequally, if contributions are voluntary and independently determined (i.e., no bargaining). Countries 2 3 At first glance, Saudi Arabia's higher relative contribution appears justified because they were most directly threatened by further Iraqi aggression. However, the threat may not have been significantly lower for the other GCC states, particularly the United Arab Emirates. Iraq had grouped the United Arab Emirates with Kuwait in its accusat -s of excess oil production. Considering this, and the geographic location anL "ilitary power of these countries, it is not unreasonable to conclude that their national sovereignty benefit was similar to that received by Saudi Arabia 2 4 1n Germany's case, the external pressure to contribute was particularly intense, in part because of Germany's link to Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities. (Hippler, 1991; Walsh, 1991) placing the highest value on the public good (as indicated by both preferences and ability to pay) would bear a share of the total costs that exceeds their share of the total benefits. Countries with a lower value for the public good bear a lower share of costs relative to benefits. In fact, some countries may not contribute at all (i.e., the privileged group). Inequities may be reduced In many cases, they may be selected to demonstrate a particular political viewpoint (e.g., Senate, 1991).
Unfortunately, measurement problems make it impossible to construct an objective disproportionality index that is universally accepted. Recognizing that it is impossible to measure ex post equity should refocus the burden sharing debate from outcomes to processes. If we can't measure outcomes to determine equity, we must establish a fair process. If everyone agrees that the process is fair, measuring the outcome becomes unnecessary. For example, the firemen at a local fire station play basketball, ping pong and other competitive games to determine who washes the dishes each day. Because they agree the process is fair, they don't have to track how many times each individual washes the dishes. Producers are assumed to maximize profits in both oil and industrial production. Profits are given by:
GnP is the sum of the relevant profits:
Countries are assumed to maximize utility subject to their budget (GDP) constraint.
Max U i -Xjai Yibi S.t. B i -PX Xi -PY Yi = 0 where Bi-GDPi.
For equilibrium, supply and demand must be equal in both the oil and industrial products markets. This is given by:
Equilibrium Solution
To solve for equilibrium in this model, we can find the profit maximizing conditions for oil and industrial production ^nd the utility maximizing conditions for the final products market for each country. These profit and utility maximizing conditions can be expressed in terms of known parameters and the equilibrium prices of the final products. These relationships can be combined with equilibrium conditions for the oil and industrial markets to find the equilibrium prices of oil and industrial goods.
Given these prices, we can find specific values for the quantity of oil and industrial goods produced and consumed in each country, and the resulting GDP. Assume that good Y is the numeraire (i.e., Py = 1 and Px = P). P will adjust to ensure equilibrium in both the oil and industrial goods markets.
Because there are only two goods in the economy, Walras Law states that equilibrium in one market ensures equilibrium in other market. Thus, the equilibrium price, pe, can be derived by finding the price that equates total supply and demand in either the oil or industrial goods markets. In other words, P 5 can be found by using the profit and utility maximizing conditions from above to solve: Thus, in Country 1, the oil price elasticity balances the mpacts Df higher oil prices on both oil and industrial production. In Countries 2 and 3, with their specialized economies, the oil price elasticity depends completely on the impact of higher oil prices on industrial production and oil production, respectively.
Simulation Results
The model was used to examine the impact of a 50% reduction in Country 3's oil production on GDP in Countries 1 and 2. Conventional wisdom seems to indicate that "foreign oil dependence" is a good proxy for measuring the relative economic impact of oil price increases across industrialized countries. This exercise was designed to caution against blindly using this proxy by showing that the decrease in Country 2's GDP can be greater than, equal to, or less than the decrease in Country l's GDP, even though Country 2 is more reliant on imported oil than Country 1. Thus, "foreign oil dependence" is not always a good proxy for measuring the economic impact of oil supply disruptions. The oil price elasticity of GDP is a more appropriate measure.
Oil production is endogenously determined in this model. for each scenario are shown in Table A2 . In scenario 1, the percentage decrease in GDP is larger in Country 1. In scenario 2, the percentage decrease in GDP is the same in both countries. Finally, in scenario 3, the percentage decrease in GDP is larger in Country 2. This final scenario corresponds to the conventional wisdom that the effect of oil price increases are greater for countries more dependent on foreign oil. 
